DNSSEC Key Signing Key Rollover

The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) will be changing the Root Zone Key Signing Key (KSK) used in the domain name system (DNS) Security Extensions (DNSSEC) protocol.

Threat ID:: CC-1599
Category:
Threat Severity:: Medium
Threat Vector:
Published:: 23 August 2017 12:00 AM

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Summary

The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) will be changing the Root Zone Key Signing Key (KSK) used in the domain name system (DNS) Security Extensions (DNSSEC) protocol.

Threat details

DNSSEC is a set of DNS protocol extensions used to digitally sign DNS information, which is an important part of preventing domain name hijacking. Updating the DNSSEC KSK is a crucial security step, similar to updating a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Root Certificate. Maintaining an up-to-date Root KSK as a trust anchor is essential to ensuring DNSSEC-validating DNS resolvers continue to function after the rollover. Systems belonging to organizations that do not use DNSSEC validation will be unaffected by the rollover.

The rollover was due to take place on the 11 October 2017, however it has been postponed. This article will be updated once the new rollover date is announced.

Remediation steps

Type	Step
	Administrators are encouraged to update their DNSSEC KSK. See the NIST/NTIA Roll Ready site and the ICANN Root Zone KSK Rollover resources page for more information.

Last edited: 17 January 2022 5:48 pm